"The Sad Duty of Politics": Jimmy Carter and the Issue of Race in His 1970 Gubernatorial Campaign

By Randy Sanders

Jimmy Carter's campaign for Georgia's governorship has remained virtually from its inception more than a little puzzling, and even somewhat mysterious. The puzzlement felt by Carter's political opponents and by astute observers from the beginning of the campaign spread to the wider Georgia and national public at his inauguration. "I say to you quite frankly that the time for racial discrimination is over," he declared. "Our people have already made this major and difficult decision. No poor, rural, weak or black person should ever have to bear the additional burden of being deprived of the opportunity for an education, a job, or simple justice."[1]

In itself such a pronouncement was not extraordinary, even when made by a southern politician. Similar statements were being made by a number of southern governors elected around the same time. Many had even campaigned on that note. But Jimmy Carter had not. To many it seemed that, at best, he had equivocated on the racial issue, and at worst, he had pandered outright to racism. Little wonder that many of the 339,000 Georgians who had voted for him listened to his words in amazement.[2]

[1]Jimmy Carter, *A Government as Good as Its People* (New York, 1977), 14.

[2]There are several good accounts of Carter's 1970 campaign. Jimmy Carter's autobiographical *Why Not the Best?* (Nashville, 1975), contains a short but revealing chapter on 1970. The most detailed accounts of the 1970 campaign are from the following works: Leslie Wheeler, *Jimmy Who? An Examination of Presidential Candidate Jimmy Carter: The Man, His Career, His Stands on the Issues* (New York, 1976), 45-61; Reg Murphy and Hal Gulliver, *The Southern Strategy* (New York, 1971), 173-97; and Betty Glad, *Jimmy Carter: In Search of the Great White House* (New York, 1980), 123-40. Bill Shipp, political editor of the *Atlanta Constitution* in 1970, had contacts within the Carter campaign and wrote a revealing account which ran in the *Atlanta Constitution* as a four-part series, November 8-11, 1970, entitled "How He Won It." For an illuminating insight into

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The many questions that immediately arose concerning the inconsistency, Jimmy Carter adroitly sidestepped. And he has continued to sidestep ever since. Aside from a few references in his 1975 autobiography, he has made no mention of the campaign in his writings, and he has been reluctant to talk about the race. When pressed to repudiate his tactics in that race, Carter has responded by attacking the Atlanta newspapers for distorted coverage on his campaign. Moreover, he has sequestered his 1970 gubernatorial campaign papers in his presidential library in Atlanta, where they remain unprocessed, unscheduled for processing, and hence unavailable for examination.[3] Something about the 1970 campaign bothered James Earl Carter, Jr. deeply.

The 1970 race was not Jimmy Carter's first try for Georgia's governorship. He had run four years earlier, in 1966. Carter did not like being positioned on the left or right of the political spectrum, saying "I believe that I'm a more complicated person than that." But in 1966 Carter appealed to the moderate-liberal voter, and conducted a gentlemanly and non-racist campaign. Bruce Galphine of the *Atlanta Constitution* wrote at the time that it was hard to meet Jimmy Carter and hear him talk without "admiring his integrity." Here, Galphin went on to say, was a breed of politician new to Georgia, subdued, frank even about his deficiencies, and "refusing to torture the traditional whipping boys."[4]

In 1966, race was still Georgia's most readily exploitable political issue. But Jimmy Carter refused to use it. He was not

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Carter's strategy, see James Clotfelter and William R. Hamilton (Carter's pollster), "Electing a Governor in the Seventies," in Thad Beyle and J. Oliver Williams, eds., *American Governors in Behavioral Perspective* (New York, 1972), 32-39. Two campaign aides from the Sanders campaign provide an insider's account in Robert Coram and Remer Tyson, "The Loser Who Won," *Atlanta Magazine* (November 1970), 41-99. See also Margaret Spears Lyons, "A Comparison of Carl Sanders' Gubernatorial Campaigns: 1962 and 1970" (M.A. thesis, University of Georgia, 1971). Also very helpful were interviews with participants and observers of the 1970 campaign by the Georgia Government Documentation Project, Special Collections, Georgia State University.

[3]This guarding of documents is uncharacteristic of Carter. On the last day of his gubernatorial term he allowed the Georgia Department of Archives and History to pick up his papers with an agreement that archive officials would "make the papers available to the public as quickly as possible with no restrictions on access." Gary Fink, *Prelude to the Presidency: The Political Character and Legislative Leadership Style of Governor Jimmy Carter* (Westport, Conn., 1980), xvii.

[4]Bruce Galphin, "Jimmy Carter — A New Breed," *Atlanta Constitution*, July 2, 1966.

a racist, and his integrity precluded opportunism. Years earlier in his hometown of Plains, Carter had refused, in the face of considerable pressure, to join the White Citizens Council, and in a heated congregational squabble he made an impassioned speech in favor of allowing blacks to worship in his church. As a state senator, he made one of his first speeches in opposition to Georgia's infamous "thirty questions" law used to disqualify black voters.[5]

Though he finished a surprisingly close third in the 1966 race, the outcome convinced Jimmy Carter that the racial issue, like it or not, could not be ignored. The winner and new governor was Lester Maddox, who had garnered national notoriety by threatening to use an ax-handle on any black who entered the Atlanta restaurant he owned.

After his 1966 loss, Carter began some hard thinking and decided two things. One, he would run again in 1970. That surprised no one who knew him or had observed him closely. As one journalist observed, "to go out and make nice speeches and lose is not Jimmy Carter's style." The other thing Jimmy Carter decided was, as he later wrote in his autobiography, that he "did not intend to lose again." That meant he was going to have to make a third decision.[6]

Eight years earlier, George Wallace, like Jimmy Carter, had lost his 1958 bid for Alabama's governorship because he was perceived as more moderate than his race-baiting opponent, John Patterson. As a result, Wallace had decided, and declared, that he would never be "out-nigguhed again." Jimmy Carter was going to have to decide if he would go in the same direction, and if so, how far. Before he made that decision, he would have to wait and see how the Georgia political situation would shape up in 1970.[7]

In the meantime he kept himself in the public eye. He traveled the state on the civic club speech-making circuit, kept active in the Baptist church, farm organizations, business groups, and the Lions Club, and had himself made state chair-

[5]Wheeler, *Jimmy Who?* 35.

[6]William Lee Miller, *Yankee from Georgia* (New York, 1978), 109; Carter, *Why Not the Best?* 112.

[7]Marshall Frady, *Wallace* (New York, 1968), 127.



In Georgia's 1966 gubernatorial election, Jimmy Carter refused to exploit racist tactics and lost to Lester Maddox (above), who ran a very effective racist campaign using ax-handles as a symbol of his defiance of integration. *Photograph courtesy of Richard B. Russell Memorial Library, University of Georgia.*

man of the March of Dimes. By the time he announced his candidacy Jimmy Carter had visited more than 400 towns, made more than 1,800 speeches, and met 600,000 Georgians.[8]

By 1968 certain prominent features of the 1970 political landscape were becoming clear. On the one hand, Georgia was going to have the first black candidate for governor in its history, and black voters constituted 20 percent of the electorate. On the other hand, 1970 would be the first gubernatorial election since George Wallace carried Georgia in his 1968 bid for the presidency, and the state's electorate remained highly receptive to his brand of anti-establishment, anti-integration rhetoric. And to complicate matters further, the Republican party, for the first time since Reconstruction, had a good chance to capture Georgia's governorship. In 1966 the Republican candidate had actually received a plurality of the votes in the general election, but had lost out when the lack of a majority for any candidate threw the election into the heavily Democratic state legislature.

[8]Neal R. Peirce, *The Deep South States of America: People, Politics, and Power in the Seven Deep South States* (New York, 1974), 320.

In other words, Georgia would be standing at a crossroads in 1970. In which direction would it go? Did Lester Maddox's election in 1966 indicate a direction, or was it just a fluke? If one looked at the Georgia political scene just prior to Maddox's election, and compared it to other southern states, one would be prone to dismiss the whole Maddox affair as an anomaly. The state's governor from 1962 to 1966, Carl Sanders, had been one of the first southern politicians to stake out, and hold, a moderate position on racial matters. According to the *Christian Science Monitor*, Sanders was "one of the South's most moderate, progressive chief executives."[9] He ran promising to keep public schools open even if it meant integrating them, and as governor, he stuck to his promise. Moreover, he kept a tight reign on the legislature and never allowed it to influence public opinion with anything like the series of anti-integration enactments passed by many southern state legislatures of the time. At the end of his term Sanders was still immensely popular, and had Georgia law not prevented successive gubernatorial terms, he would almost certainly have been reelected in 1966. During his four years out of office Sanders continued to have strong political and financial support and was considered by virtually all political observers as the odds-on favorite to win in 1970. Sanders' popularity and strong support militated in favor of believing that Georgia in 1970 would resume her moderate-liberal course, after a four-year Maddox aberration.

But the enormous popularity Maddox had built up during his four years in office could not be ignored. The Georgia electorate had wildly applauded his branding of integration as "un-American, un-Godly and even criminal" and had responded to his call to keep white children out of integrated schools with a zeal not seen in the state since the days of Eugene Talmadge in the 1930s.[10] Maddox's popularity, taken in conjunction with the 1968 Wallace-for-president vote in the state, could well be read as an indication that in 1970, Georgia was destined for another Maddox-like Democrat, or even a like-minded Republican.

[9]*Christian Science Monitor*, January 16, 1970, 15.

[10]Harold P. Henderson and Gary L. Roberts, eds., *Georgia Governors in an Age of Change* (Athens, 1988), 295.

Jimmy Carter depicted the popular Carl Sanders (left), his principal opponent in the 1970 governor's race, as a "brash, young, eager man who doesn't deserve to be governor." *Photograph courtesy of Richard B. Russell Memorial Library, University of Georgia.*

With all of that in mind Carter began planning for his 1970 campaign in 1968. His instincts told him that, with Maddox prevented by constitutional provision from succeeding himself and with no Maddox-like figure in prominence, Carl Sanders was the man he was going to have to beat. Accordingly, that year Carter scribbled a memo to an aide: "Some images to be projected regarding Carl Sanders . . . refuses to let Georgia Democrats have a voice in the Democratic party . . . Atlanta-oriented . . . pretty boy . . . nouveau riche . . . excluded George Wallace from state . . . right now we just need to collect all these rough ideas we can. Later we can start driving a wedge between me and him."[11]

But Carter did not rely on his instincts alone. He hired Washington pollster William Hamilton, who made five surveys between September of 1969 and October 1970. The first of these surveys confirmed Carter's original feelings. Eighty-four percent of Georgia voters had a favorable view of Sanders' governorship, and 20 percent rated him "excellent." Hamilton noted in his report to Carter that "this is one of the best job ratings I have ever seen given a former governor after three years out of office." If the election were held immediately, Hamilton's poll indicated, Sanders would get 53 percent of the vote and Carter only 21 percent. But the report also pointed

[11]Glad, *In Search of the Great White House*, 127.

out that no one had started "shooting at" Sanders yet and that Carter had plenty of time to build a "favorable image" among voters who did not yet know him.[12]

Moreover, Hamilton's report stressed, there were a few chinks in Sanders' armor. From 20 to 25 percent of Sanders' support was "soft," meaning there was something about him his supporters did not like: his affluence since leaving the governor's office; his ties to the "Atlanta bigwigs"; or his closeness to Washington. That convinced Jimmy Carter. He would make Carl Sanders into a rich "brash, young, eager man who doesn't deserve to be governor," and portray himself as a humble country boy who was "not going to let him be."[13]

The other contender in the Democratic primary to significantly affect Carter's strategy was the black candidate, C. B. King. King was an Albany lawyer (one of only three black lawyers in the state outside of Atlanta in the early 1960s) who had played a prominent role in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference's Albany movement in 1962.[14] Despite a solid record of achievement as a civil rights attorney, black support for King was divided. Some black leaders and political organizations endorsed King, but most of the others, believing that he could not win, even if he made the Democratic run-off election, supported Sanders. Few, at that point, supported Carter. But for Carter that was a blessing. King could not possibly make the run-off, but he would draw enough black votes to keep Sanders from winning on the first ballot, giving Carter a good chance of being in a run-off with Sanders.

But where would Carter get enough votes to make it into a run-off? With his natural constituency of moderates, liberals, and blacks preempted by Sanders and King, Carter's only hope lay with the Maddox-Wallace camp. Aside from the moral dilemma such an association implied for Carter personally, its accomplishment in practical terms would be tricky. He would need to make himself attractive to Georgia's "lower status whites" as Numan Bartley called them in his *From Thurmond to*

[12]*Atlanta Constitution,* November 8, 1970, 2A.

[13]Clotfelter and Hamilton, "Electing a Governor," 35; *Atlanta Journal,* April 7, 1970, 2A.

[14]The best account of C. B. King's role in the Albany movement is found in Taylor Branch, *Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-63* (New York, 1988), 524-31.

Wallace, the state's "most politically conservative people . . . racists in social attitudes, fundamentalist in religion, provincial in outlook."[15] At the same time, Carter could not make himself so attractive to the Maddox and Wallace people as to permanently alienate Georgia's moderate, liberal and black voters. If he managed to win the Democratic nomination, he would need their support in the general election, in which he would face a Republican.

His plan to paint Sanders as a smug, citified dandy would sell well in poor rural Georgia. It always had. And Sanders would be an easy target, for after his term expired he had remained in Atlanta to become a rich lawyer. Caricaturing Sanders, however, would not be enough. Carter would also have to appeal to the Maddox-Wallace people on issues. In the memo he dictated in 1966, Carter had noted that he might need to portray Sanders as too liberal for Georgia voters, "more liberal" was his exact phrase. And William Hamilton's poll of 1969 had confirmed that hunch. Hamilton noted that Sanders had "a slight problem with his liberal image."[16]

Carter decided that to win the support of Maddox-Wallace followers, he was going to have to place himself to the right of Sanders. Although Carter was, in fact, the more liberal of the two, his record was not as well known as Sanders'. That fact made the scheme workable. As a first step in placing himself to the right of Sanders, Carter made his cousin, Hugh Carter, his campaign manager. Hugh Carter was a good-old-boy politician with solid conservative credentials. His job was to reassure conservatives in the state that "Jimmy Carter was a safe man." Jimmy Carter could easily combine his planned portrayal of Sanders as too rich to understand the average man, too citified, too sophisticated and too liberal for Georgians, with attacks on his ties to "big government," to "the power elite," and to "the Washington establishment," all phrases George Wallace had made popular. In short, Carter would make Sanders into a "limousine liberal."[17]

[15]Numan V. Bartley, *From Thurmond to Wallace: Political Tendencies in Georgia, 1948-1968* (Baltimore, 1970), 140.

[16]Bill Shipp, *Atlanta Constitution*, November 8, 1970, 2A.

[17]Glad, *In Search of the Great White House*, 126; Clotfelter and Hamilton, "Electing a Governor," 35.

But again that would not be enough. While it was true, a Reg Murphy and Hal Gulliver pointed out in *The Southern Strategy*, that "liberal" and "conservative" were racial code words in the South, "liberal" meaning integrationist and "conservative meaning segregationist, such code words alone would not convince the Maddox-Wallace camp. As much as he may have wished, Jimmy Carter could not escape dealing with the integration issue. According to one poll, public sentiment that integration was moving too fast rose from 35 percent in March 1968 to 54 percent in April 1970. And anti-black feeling among Georgia voters jumped from 10 to 49 percent in the same period. As Jim Gillis, Jr., a county commissioner and son of Georgia's powerful highway department director said at the time: "The school thing is like a funeral. The family knows you can't bring the body back to life, but they want you there holding their hands." Although Jimmy Carter never heard Gillis' analogy, he understood it well, and he determined to be there, holding the hands of Georgia's segregationists.[18]

At the same time he was holding hands with conservatives and segregationists, Jimmy Carter had to reach out to liberal and black voters. An awkward posture, to say the least, but one necessary both to assuage his conscience as well as insure their support against the Republican nominee in the later general election. In effect, Carter's campaign plan called for a two-faceted—his critics would say a two-faced—campaign: one facet designed to appeal to segregationists and the other to give heart to liberals and blacks.

To obscure the inconsistencies in his two-faceted strategy and to excuse his personal attacks on Sanders, Carter cloaked the whole of his campaign in the guise of "populism." According to one of the early polls Hamilton did for Carter, 81 percent of the Georgia electorate felt alienated from government. In addition to integration coming too fast, they were most concerned about high taxes and the welfare system, "the issues of Nixon's forgotten man, middle America." Political pragmatism dictated that Carter must appeal to racist elements in Georgia's electorate, but he would run a "redneck" campaign, emphasiz-

[18]Murphy and Gulliver, *Southern Strategy*, 182-83; Coram and Tyson, "Loser," 66 and 43.

Your Ticket for Four Years of
Good Government by all Georgians

JIMMY CARTER FOR GOVERNOR

FUND RAISING BARBECUE SUPPER
AND RALLY
Eve Park Baseball Field, Tifton, Ga.
8:00 P.M., Thursday, August 27, 1970

Please come and have this souvenier ticket validated
SPONSORED BY SOUTH GEORGIANS FOR CARTER

Isn't it time somebody spoke up for YOU?

Donation $5.00

CARTER

No. 1341

While Carter appealed at times to both blacks and segregationists, he glossed over the inconsistencies with a populist approach, as suggested by this ticket to a barbeque fundraiser. "My campaign is based on peanuts, pennies, and people," he insisted. *Ticket appeared as illustration in Hugh Carter,* Cousin Beedie and Cousin Hot: My Life with the Carter Family of Plains, Georgia *(Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1978).*

ing class rather than race distinctions. He would embrace all workers in the rhetoric of populism, while carefully avoiding any overt appeal to racism. That way he could perhaps deflate the race issues.[19]

"Jimmy can and does appeal to the Wallace voter, but not on the racial thing," said Charles Kirbo, a long-time Carter friend and political advisor. "Wallace has got a lot of support from people . . . [who] are just down on the government. And he's got a lot of populist support. Jimmy is a populist."[20]

There was nothing unusual, much less unique, about Jimmy Carter's appeal to "populism." What James Perry of the *National Observer* called a "new populism" was sweeping the South in 1970. New faces in the Democratic party were winning elections to governors' and senators' seats by refocusing their party objectives in terms of the common man. "More important for the Democrats than specific issues was the successful selling of the populist symbols," wrote James Clotfelter and William Hamilton (Carter's pollster) in *South Today*. "The common ingredient was voter's believing the candidate cared about what they cared

[19]Clotfelter and Hamilton, "Electing a Governor," 34-36.
[20]Alexander P. Lamis, *The Two Party South* (New York, 1984), 98.

about, that he was one of their own and would not forget them."[21]

When Carter announced his candidacy in early April 1970, he mapped out his strategy for Steve Ball, political editor of the *Atlanta Journal.* He would aim his campaign at a coalition of Georgians in the middle and low-income brackets. This included Nixon's silent majority, the poor, both black and white, and the conservative Georgians who had voted for Lester Maddox in 1966 and for George Wallace in 1968. His appeal, he went on to say, would be to "average working people" who wanted "someone in the governor's office who understands their problems."[22]

Looking back on the campaign twenty years later, Carl Sanders admitted that Carter suceeded in drawing "more of a class distinction than a race distinction. I think he postured himself as a peanut farmer from outside of Atlanta and . . . he pictured me as a corporate lawyer in Atlanta who had capitalized on being governor and who was now representing the fat cats and he was out there representing the average citizen. That's a pretty tough thing to overcome."[23]

Jimmy Carter succeeded, to be sure. But his success proved to be both gruesomely hard and soul-taxing. The only easy part was adopting, adapting, and inventing his own brand of "populism." In the minds of rural and urban blue-collar Georgia voters, nothing better represented the wealth and power of the establishment than the Atlanta press. "The people in the state," said one long-time politico, "whatever the Atlanta newspapers are for, they're against." Successful Georgia politicians had been haranguing "those lying Atlanta newspapers" since the campaigns of Eugene Talmadge in the 1930s.[24]

Jimmy Carter simply continued the tradition. He did not want, he insisted, the support of "the big-shots that own the Atlanta newspapers." He charged that the *Atlanta Constitution* made a "major editorial commitment" to smear him, particularly

[21]James Perry, *National Observer,* April 7, 1971, 5; James Clotfelter and William Hamilton, "But Which Southern Strategy?" *South Today* 2 (April 1971): 7.

[22]*Atlanta Journal,* April 7, 1970, 2A.

[23]Carl Sanders, taped interview with author, March 28, 1989, Atlanta.

[24]Peirce, *The Deep South,* 320; William C. Harvard, ed., *The Changing Politics of the South* (Baton Rouge, 1972), 303.

in its political cartoons. Carter's press aide, Bill Pope, said after the campaign: "We loved all those scurrilous cartoons. We just didn't want it to stop." Bill Shipp was right when he later wrote that Carter had "calculatedly incurred the wrath of the big city daily press."[25]

At the same time, Jimmy Carter made himself look as ordinary and colorless as he could, or at least his political image packager, Gerald Rafshoon, did. Billboards and brochures carried the ugliest photograph of Carter his staff could find. "It made Jimmy look like an average working man," a Carter campaign aide said. The picture made him look like "he had a little fear in him . . . a little wary perhaps."[26] That Carter made sure he looked like a populist was significant because, in the words of his own pollster, William Hamilton, Carter was a "stylistic populist" whose success derived not from changing specific policies, but from "personal campaign style."[27]

More uniquely his own was Jimmy Carter's ability at personal campaigning. Over the months he shook thousands of hands in factory shift lines at 5 A.M. and again at midnight. And eighteen-hour days of non-stop campaigning were typical. In many small counties a visit from someone running for governor was rare. Carter visited most of the small counties not once but two or three times, and shook every hand he could find. Numerous observers noted the effectiveness of this person-to-person campaigning: "It is a peculiar thing, involving human warmth, and not relating at all to issues," wrote the *Atlanta Journal*'s Steve Ball. "It works for him everywhere." Even Reg Murphy, editor of the *Atlanta Constitution* and one of Carter's severest critics, admitted that "one-on-one, he's probably as convincing as anybody I've ever seen."[28]

Carter found the personal campaigning natural, did not mind the toning down of his looks, and managed the populist rhetoric easily because, in his heart, he believed it. But discredit-

[25]*Atlanta Constitution*, September 4, 1970, 1 and 22A; *ibid.*, August 26, 1971, 18A; Bill Pope quotation in *ibid.*, November 11, 1970, 14A.

[26]*Ibid.*, November 11, 1970, 14A.

[27]Clotfelter and Hamilton, "Electing a Governor," 34.

[28]*Atlanta Constitution*, November 8, 1970, 2A; Steve Ball, *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, August 23, 1970, 7A; Reg Murphy quote in Bruce Mazlish and Edwin Diamond, *Jimmy Carter: An Interpretative Biography* (New York, 1979), 181.

ing Sanders proved much harder for Carter as a man, for the process had to be pushed much further than he initially thought. In the end it amounted to blackening Sanders' character, something that Carter must have found hard to justify to himself.

Carter's polls indicated that average voters watched television but did not read newspapers, which dictated a TV crusade against Sanders. That crusade focused on portraying Jimmy Carter as the candidate of the working man, and Carl Sanders as the candidate of the ultra-rich. One commercial showed Carter harvesting peanuts. The voice-over asked, "can you imagine any of the other candidates for governor working in the hot August sun? Isn't it time someone spoke up for you?" Carter's fund-raising ads said other candidates were supported by "big money asking for big favors," but that "Jimmy Carter made it the hard way."[29]

What was probably Carter's most effective commercial opened with the camera panning in on a closed door. Voice-over: "This is the door to an exclusive country club, where the big-money boys play cards, drink cocktails, and raise money for their candidate, Carl Sanders." Country club door swings open; close-up of man writing check. Voice-over: "People like us aren't invited. We're too busy working for a living." Footage of Carter talking with an "average man." Voice-over: "That's why our votes are going for Jimmy Carter. Vote for Jimmy Carter, our kind of man, our kind of governor."[30]

"Carter used television very effectively," remembered Bill Shipp, "with Gerry Rafshoon doing a whole series of some of the best negative advertising I've ever seen aimed at Sanders. And Sanders' own advertising played right into their hands."[31]

The Sanders advertising campaign actually benefited Carter. Sanders' ads were expensive, slick, and elitist. Sanders was pictured jogging, boating, and flying his plane. Sanders avoided appealing to the common man and portrayed himself as prosperous and prestigious. And the Sanders campaign slogan did not sit well with many Georgians. "Carl Sanders ought to be

[29]Clotfelter and Hamilton, "Electing a Governor," 36.

[30]*Ibid.*, 34.

[31]Interview with Bill Shipp by Cliff Kuhn, April 22, 1987, Georgia Government Documentation Project, Special Collections, Georgia State University, 43.

governor again." Two of Sanders' own campaign aides later admitted that the slogan sounded like Sanders had a right to be governor, as if it were "a monarchical privilege."[32]

Carter saw his opportunity and made the most of it. He immediately began portraying Sanders as a king who had robbed his subjects. In one of Carter's televised spots Sanders, whom Carter always called "Cuff Links Carl," was shown boarding a Lear jet; then the camera quickly cut to a close-up of a man's hand taking hold of a briefcase full of money. At the wrists were huge cuff links.[33]

Throughout the campaign Carter harped on the theme that Sanders had "used secret-information to get rich." Over and over, Carter proclaimed that "Georgians never again want a governor who will use the tremendous power and prestige of office for his own personal wealth." And once, while campaigning at a bank, Carter stuck his head into a vault and quipped: "Looks like Carl Sanders' basement."[34] When Sanders retorted by calling Carter a penny-ante politician, Carter again bested him. Yes, he said, "my campaign is based on peanuts, pennies, and people. That's better than one based on bucks, banks, and boondogles."[35]

In fact, Carl Sanders' administration had not had a hint of scandal about it. And Carter's own polling information indicated that only 1 percent of the electorate believed Sanders had used the governor's office for personal gain. But Jimmy Carter would make sure that by election day a great many more voters believed it. Carter attacked Sanders daily, and promised the press that he had proof of Sanders' misdeeds that he would release in due course. At the same time, Carter put Sanders on the defensive by repeatedly calling for public disclosure of his personal finances. Sanders could only lamely protest that his personal finances were not part of the campaign.[36]

Two weeks before the primary Carter released his long awaited "proof" that Carl Sanders had abused the powers of

[32]Coram and Tyson, "Loser," 41.
[33]*Atlanta Constitution*, July 21, 1970, 6A; *Atlanta Journal*, July 28, 1970, 1.
[34]*Atlanta Constitution*, April 4, 1970, 4A; *ibid.*, April 11, 1970, 15A.
[35]*Ibid*,. August 28, 1970, 1.
[36]*Ibid.* November 11, 1970, 1 and 11A; Coram and Tyson, "Loser," 96.

Both Jimmy Carter and Carl Sanders spoke at the 1970 meeting of the Georgia Forestry Association in Tifton, where Carter's emphasis on the contrast between his rural roots and Sanders' urban elitism probably played well. *Photographs from Hargrett Rare Book and Manuscript Library, University of Georgia Libraries.*

the governor's office. He charged that Sanders, while governor, had used his influence with the Federal Communications Commission to help a friend and business associate acquire several television and radio stations. Carter handed out copies of papers filed with the FCC. The documents listed Sanders as secretary of his friend's firm, gave his occupation as governor of Georgia, and listed his address as the governor's mansion. But the documents also showed that Sanders owned no stock in the company.[37]

Carter's bombshell had proven a dud, and the newspapers had a field day. Carter had, in the words of the *Macon Telegraph*, "over-promised and under-delivered." The *Macon News* labeled Carter "a classic example of a good man whose high standards have been undermined by political ambition." And the *Atlanta Constitution* wrote that Carter had gone at Sanders with a "ven-

[37]*Atlanta Constitution*, August 27, 1970, 1.

gance." The best Jimmy Carter could do was admit there was no proof of illegality, but insist that the facts showed "a consistent pattern of combining political and business interests on behalf of Mr. Sanders." The weakness of that response did not matter, for the damage to Sanders had been done. The dirty trick had worked. But Carter was beginning to pay the price of conscience. According to Phil Gardner, editor of the *Atlanta Journal*, Jimmy Carter, at the time, agonized over "whether he should have used the tactic in the first place."[38]

But there were far more and dirtier tricks played on Sanders. Early in the summer the Carter campaign put out a series of anonymous pamphlets and "fact-sheets" that hit Sanders from all sides. One of the most effective was a photograph of Carl Sanders being doused with champagne by a black Atlanta Hawks basketball player during a victory celebration. The picture became known as the "champagne shampoo." Copies were mailed to small-town barbershops, rural churches, service stations, and country stores, and passed out at Ku Klux Klan rallies. Sanders was part owner of the Atlanta Hawks and the photograph originally had run on the sports page of the *Atlanta Constitution*. But as a political flyer it reminded people that Sanders was rich and associated him with high-living and alcohol, both still bugaboos in puritanical and teetotaling rural Georgia.[39]

Most importantly, the photograph associated Sanders, in a close personal way, with blacks. That association was carried further by "fact sheets" that said or implied that Sanders was a close ally of the controversial black state representative, Julian Bond (actually the two detested each other); that Sanders had

[38]*Macon Telegraph*, August 28, 1970, 4A; *Macon News*, editorial reprinted in *Atlanta Constitution*, September 3, 1970, 5A; *Atlanta Constitution*, August 27, 1970, 1; *Atlanta Journal*, July 20, 1970, 2A.

[39]Bill Shipp reported on the anonymous pamphlet aimed at Sanders in *Atlanta Constitution*, June 14, 1970, 1; Stephen Brill first produced evidence that Carter campaign workers were responsible for the pamphlets in "Jimmy Carter's Pathetic Lies," *Harper's* (March 1976), 79-80. In early February Jody Powell issued a twenty-two page rebuttal to the Brill article prior to its publication and several newspapers ran excerpts from both the article and the rebuttal. See "Charges and Responses Relating to Carter," compiled by Bill Allen, 3/76 - 6/76, [CF,O/A 751], Box 1, Press Office - Powell, Carter-Mondale Campaign Materials file, Jimmy Carter Library; Phil Stanford assessed the charges in the Brill article and the Carter media coverage in general in "'The most remarkable piece of fiction' Jimmy Carter ever read," *Columbia Journalism Review* (July/August 1976), 16.

attended the funeral of Martin Luther King, Jr., which in fact, he had; and that as governor Sanders had conspired to keep George Wallace out of Georgia (Sanders had). Bill Pope, Carter's press secretary, prepared the leaflets and Carter's top campaign aide, Hamilton Jordan, directed their mailing. Such tactics were all part of an operation Carter campaign workers called the "stink tank."[40]

In order to win the Democratic nomination, Jimmy Carter needed to draw as much black support away from Sanders as possible. But at the same time, he needed to string black voters along, for he would need their support in the general election in which he would face a Republican. The two-faceted campaign was again in play.

The "stink tank" was once again put to work. The Carter campaign created a fictitious "Black Concern Committee." The "committee" sent pamphlets that charged Sanders had not kept his 1962 campaign promises to black voters, and even implied that Sanders had been responsible for the death of a black prison inmate. These sheets were mailed to black barber shops, funeral homes, and pool halls. Simultaneously, the Rafshoon agency, in order to draw black votes away from Sanders, prepared and paid for radio spots for C. B. King. And at the same time Carter consistently asserted that he had "excellent support from the NAACP and Negro churchmen across the state," and he told black Atlanta leader Vernon Jordan: "You won't like my campaign, but you will like my administration."[41]

Carter also went directly to black voters. Although Carter's staff advised against it, he was the only candidate to campaign openly in black communities. "I've been to see 'em in their filling stations, in their churches," Carter would be able to say. "I've been to see 'em in their drugstores and in their homes." And on one occasion, for example, Carter walked to the back of a small town drugstore to shake hands with a black janitor whom he could easily have ignored, while three whites he had just been talking to looked on disapprovingly. Carter promised to appoint black citizens to high-level state offices and constitu-

[40]Coram and Tyson, "Loser," 95; Brill, "Carter's Pathetic Lies," 79.

[41]Brill, "Carter's Pathetic Lies." 79-80; *Atlanta Constitution*, June 21, 1970, 14A; Vernon Jordan quote in William Lee Miller, *Yankee from Georgia* (New York, 1978), 107.

tional boards, saying that "the state ought to set the example in its employment."[42]

Far more painful for Carter than stringing black voters along was appealing to Georgia's segregationists. Here he employed dual purpose rhetoric with acumen. While he never outright said he was a segregationist, he managed to leave that impression with a great many voters. Hamilton Jordan told the *Atlanta Journal* that in some counties the Carter campaign actually set up two organizations, one designed to cultivate the support of Wallace-Maddox supporters, and the other to appeal to more moderate-minded voters. Similarly, Republican candidate Hal Suit said that Carter had one brochure for use in extreme segregationist-minded south Georgia, and another one for distribution in the rest of the state. And during the campaign Carter, on several occasions, gave different answers to the same questions, depending on where and to whom he was speaking.[43]

Throughout the primary Carter sought to identify himself with George Wallace, even incorporating Wallace's campaign slogan, "our kind of man," into his own advertising. He said he expected "to have particularly strong support from the people who voted for George Wallace for President and the ones who voted for Lester Maddox." And he repeatedly promised he would invite George Wallace to Georgia to right the slight done the Alabama governor by Sanders, who had refused to allow Wallace to speak to the Georgia state legislature. ABC-TV's fact-book on the election concluded that Carter largely "confined his campaign promises to one issue—if elected governor he would invite George Wallace to Georgia."[44]

On one occasion Carter had said he was against giving a "single dime" to private schools; on another occasion and in a different place—this time at one of the many private schools being established in order to avoid integration—he told an au-

[42]*Atlanta Journal*, April 7, 1970, 2A; Incident of Carter shaking hands with black janitor in Steve Ball, *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, September 27, 1970, 7A; Carter quote on state employment in *Atlanta Journal*, July 28, 1970, 1; see also Murphy and Gulliver, 195.

[43]*Atlanta Journal*, July 28, 1970, 4A; Hal Suit, taped interview with author, March 27, 1989, Atlanta.

[44]Coram and Tyson, "Loser," 95; Carter quote on his support in *ibid.*, June 21, 1970, 14A; ABC-TV's fact book reported in *ibid.*, August 26, 1970, 1 and 6A; *ibid.*, November 1, 1970, 5A.

dience, "you can rest assured I'll do everything I can for private schools." More often and more typically when asked about forced integration, he sidestepped the question with responses such as "I don't like being pushed around."[45]

Five days before the primary Carter visited the Augusta police station in order to show support for two policemen charged with denying constitutional rights to two blacks shot during riots in Augusta. There he made a tough law-and-order speech. "The main thing I want you to know," Carter told the assembled police force, "is that when I am governor of Georgia, you need not ever fear I will pull the rug out from under you when you try to enforce the law against any sort of rioters or lawbreakers. I'll back you up 100 percent."[46] Press Secretary Bill Pope summed it all up after the election when he told the *Washington Post* that he had run a "nigger campaign" for Carter.[47]

In the Democratic primary on September 9, Carter won handily, with 388,280 votes, or 48.6 percent of the total. Sanders came in second with 301,179 votes, or 37.7 percent. Carter had missed winning without a run-off by only 10,000 votes. Carter's strategy had worked. He had swept the rural areas and small towns and left Sanders only urban and black voters to draw from.[48]

As planned, Carter would face a run-off election with Sanders. But Carter's unexpectedly large, 87,000-vote margin called for a change in tactics. In the run-off Carter would no longer attack Sanders, who, no longer forced to be defensive, would probably take the offensive and start attacking. Carter would then play the part of the "little man" being put upon by the rich and powerful Sanders.

[45]*Atlanta Journal*, July 27, 1970, 2A; *Atlanta Constitution*, August 19, 1970, 6A.

[46]*Atlanta Journal*, September 4, 1970, 1 and 6A.

[47]George Lardner, *Washington Post*, March 7, 1976, C3.

[48]*Atlanta Constitution*, September 24, 1970, 12A; Numan V. Bartley and Hugh D. Graham, *Southern Elections: County and Precinct Data, 1950-1972* (Baton Rouge, 1978), 94. In the counties where Lester Maddox did well, Carter also did well. Maddox, running for lieutenant governor, was the only Democrat in a multi-candidate race to win without a run-off. In 1966 Jimmy Carter's liberal image served him well in the city and in the state's northern, generally liberal to moderate counties. In 1970 these were Carter's weakest areas of support. For a fuller discussion of county voting tendencies in Georgia, see Havard, *Changing Politics*, 353-57.

Sanders immediately snapped up the bait. Two days after the primary, he called a press conference and launched into the first of a series of attacks on Carter as a liar, a "smiling hypocrite," an oppressor of tenant farmers, and an ultra-liberal who was trying to pass himself off as a hard-working farmer. "The last time Carter worked in the fields in the hot August sun," Sanders shouted, "was when his slick advertising agency took the pictures you see on television every day." Carter had worked to delete the word "God" from the Georgia constitution, had voted against old and disabled persons, and had sided with organized crime. Carter was an "unprincipled grinning chameleon."[49] "Apparently Mr. Sanders has become an embittered and desperate man," was Carter's calculated mild response. "He is now waging a smear campaign."[50]

In spite of repeated challenges by Sanders, Carter ruled out a debate with such a "bad loser." "My strength is with the people," he said, "and I intend to spend my time with them." In desperation Sanders had a television debate anyway, with an empty chair. But Carter one-upped him again. "Some folks," he quipped, "said the chair was ahead."[51]

C. B. King, the black candidate who placed third in the Democratic primary, frequently accused both Sanders and Carter of running racist campaigns. Asked for comment, Carter replied in a typical two-faceted statement, that he would appreciate any Negro votes, but added, "I can win this election without a single black vote."[52]

One day later Carter met with Roy Harris, the former chairman of Georgia's White Citizens Council, George Wallace's 1968 Georgia campaign director, and editor of the racist *Augusta Courier*. At the end of the private but much speculated upon meeting, Carter emerged with an endorsement from Harris.[53]

[49]Corman and Tyson, "Loser," 96; *Atlanta Constitution*, September 12, 1970, 1 and 12A; September 13, 1970, 2A.

[50]*Atlanta Constitution*, September 13, 1970, 2A.

[51]*Ibid.*, September 13, 1970, 2A; September 23, 1970, 15A.

[52]*Ibid.*, September 16, 1970, 1 and 15A; September 14, 1970, 3A.

[53]*Ibid.*, September 15, 1970, 1 and 6A. There was speculation at the time of Carter's meeting with Harris that there may have been a *quid pro quo* discussion concerning Harris' reappointment to the state University Board of Regents. During the general election campaign, Carter flip-flopped on whether he would or would not reappoint Harris. As governor Carter refused to reappoint Harris, and replaced him with a black

In seeking to win Maddox's segregationist supporters, Carter tried to place himself to the right of Carl Sanders. His efforts won him the endorsement of the prominent racist Roy Harris, which inspired this cartoon, distributed by the Sanders campaign. *Cartoon from the personal collection of Hal Suit, Atlanta.*

The Sanders camp was delighted. They immediately distributed a flyer featuring a cartoon of Carter climbing into bed with Roy Harris and saying: " . . . move over, Roy. You're right! Who needs black votes." And shortly afterward, the Sanders people released another flyer that had pictures of run-down tenant houses on Carter's farm, captioned with a slightly altered version of the Carter campaign slogan: "Isn't it time someone spoke up for these people?"[54]

Carter immediately fired off memos to all his county campaign chairmen telling them to get the word out that Sanders was mailing "smear sheets" that attacked him personally and stirred up racial hatreds. He was right. During the final days

man. See *Atlanta Journal*, October 16, 1970, 2A; *Atlanta Constitution*, October 22, 1970, 8A; Henderson and Roberts, *Georgia Governors*, 15.

[54]Campaign flyers in Hal Suit's personal papers labeled "Sanders material," Atlanta (hereinafter cited as Suit Papers).

of the run-off the Sanders campaign launched what amounted to a massive "smear sheet airlift." But Carter again outmaneuvered Carl Sanders. Local Carter campaign people simply met the incoming planes, posed as Sanders' campaign workers, picked up the "smear sheets," and had bonfires.[55]

On election day Sanders got his old supporters back to the polls, plus most of C. B. King's, who gave him 93 percent of the black vote. But Carter won three out of every four white votes and carried 135 of 159 counties for a 60 percent clear win. In rural counties he had routinely triumphed with three to one margins.[56]

Almost as good news for the Carter camp was that the Republican nominee was Hal Suit. If Suit's nomination surprised virtually everyone in the state, it delighted Carter and his people. Like everyone else, they had expected the Republicans to run James Bentley, and they dreaded the prospect.

State Comptroller General Jimmy Bentley was the Georgia GOP's most able politician and one of the most popular political figures in the state. Like Carter, he saw that the Maddox-Wallace vote in Georgia would be the deciding factor in the 1970 governor's race. Three months before the Republican primary Bill Shipp had written that Bentley was already "taking a campaign cue from George Wallace's victory in Alabama and is taking a hard, perhaps even vicious turn to the right." Bentley had begun running a television commercial that opened with the camera focused on an oncoming school bus. Voice over: "This year this bus and the laws that drive it threaten to change the life of your child. . . ." The bus roared closer and closer and loomed larger and larger until the screen was filled, then obliterated, by its front bumper and radiator grill. It had been possible, if painful, for Carter to place himself to the right of Sanders, but it would be impossible to "out-nigguh" Jimmy Bentley.[57]

Hal Suit, on the other hand, an Atlanta broadcaster virtually unknown outside that urban area, was a political novice. More important from the Carter camp's point of view, he had no

[55]*Atlanta Constitution*, September 21, 1970, 1 and 15A; Coram and Tyson, "Loser," 98.

[56]*Atlanta Constitution*, September 24, 1970, 1 and 12A.

[57]*Ibid.*, November 10, 1970, 7A; Bill Shipp in *ibid.*, June 15, 1970, 1; Bentley commercial reported by Bill Shipp in *ibid.*, August 18, 1970, 6A; see also *ibid.*, November 10, 1970, 7A.

established, much less well-known, reputation as a hard-liner on segregation. And as U.S. Congressman Newt Gingrich, then a history professor at West Georgia College, wrote: "Suit had only about one-fourth as much money as Carter, and about one-tenth as much organization."[58] Compared to Bentley, Suit would be a pushover. But even that would require careful planning and a lot of work. Carter would need to continue to portray himself as a "conservative" and brand Suit a "liberal." That meant continued courting of the Maddox-Wallace vote. But at the same time, Carter would also need to appeal to urban and black voters.

Suit recognized the importance of a conservative label as well as Carter did but, in fact, there were few issues on which the two candidates really differed. The only track was for the candidates to hurl accusations of "ultra-liberal" and "counterfeit conservative" at each other. "The big issue in the lackluster contest," the *Atlanta Journal* observed, "boiled down to who is the 'liberal.'"[59]

Even in the liberal-hurling contest Suit proved no match for Carter. For example, although Suit knew of Carter's voting for the integration of his own church in Plains, he considered it irrelevant to the campaign, and did not use it. In retrospect he realized he should have. The problem, as Newt Gingrich wrote, was that Suit "lacked the experience to tear away at the phony image and reveal the liberal heart under the blue collar picture."[60]

At the same time, Carter began to cut into Suit's urban constituency by shifting his target from the Atlanta establishment to the Washington power structure and the party which was, he repeatedly charged, "controlled by a handful of bigshots." Instead of going to the Georgia voters for support, Suit had, Carter said, "snuck off to Washington" for help from President Nixon. But all Suit got, he added, was "a ballpoint pen and an autographed golf ball."[61]

[58]Newt Gingrich, "Toward A Real Two Party System in Georgia," 2, Suit Papers.

[59]Murphy and Gulliver, *Southern Strategy*, 183-84; Hal Suit's debate notes, Suit Papers. *Atlanta Journal*, October 26, 1970, 1 and 9A; Harry Murphy in *ibid.*, November 2, 1970, 2A.

[60]*Atlanta Journal*, August 26, 1971, 19A; Gingrich, "Toward a Two Party System," 4-5.

[61]*Atlanta Journal*, October 7, 1970, 18A.

Even though Hal Suit was not the staunch segregationist he had expected to face in the general election, Carter followed his original plan of trying to retrieve the black support he had relinquished to Sanders in the primary. He began to soften his segregationist image and talk again in terms, however vague, of a colorblind "populist" coalition: "I got the vote of a lot of segregationists and integrationists" in the primary, Carter maintained, and "I never did ask their philosophy when I sought their vote." To a group of farmers in Abraham, Georgia, as in other towns around the state, he began saying that conservatism no longer meant, "hatred of another person because he is different from us." Nor did it mean "a lack of passion or foresight, but simply an insistence that individuals be left alone as much as possible to guide their own destinies."[62]

In a more direct appeal, Carter promised to appoint blacks to state offices and pledge to eliminate discrimination in state government. "The time's past for that," he said. In the primaries Carter had thundered that "there would be no cities burned or campuses disrupted" when he was governor. Now he began to say that the poor must cope with a government unresponsive to their needs, and that, faced with the same situation, he himself "might break a car window or steal."[63]

Jimmy Carter's courtship with segregationists paid off big in late September. Lester Maddox at that point endorsed him and praised him for "running a Maddox-type campaign." And Maddox kept up his support. Two weeks later, at a state Democratic meeting, he promised that as lieutenant governor he would be watching to make sure Carter kept his campaign promises, "When I put my money into a peanut machine, I don't expect to get bubble gum, and neither do the people." Carter, at the same meeting, swallowed his pride and praised Maddox: "He has brought a standard of forthright expression and personal honesty to the governor's office and I hope to measure up to this standard." And on the last day of the campaign Carter

[62]*Atlanta Constitution*, September 17, 1970, 1 and 13A; *Atlanta Journal*, October 23, 1970, 1 and 4A.

[63]*Atlanta Constitution*, October 21, 1970, 1 and 10A; *ibid.*, August 19, 1970, 6A; *ibid.*, October 30, 1970, 1 and 14A.

announced he was going to vote for Maddox as lieutenant governor.[64]

In Las Vegas, Jimmy the Greek set the odds for the Georgia election: Carter to win at two-and-a-half to one. The Greek was right. On November 3, 1970, Carter won 62 percent of the vote and became the seventy-sixth governor of Georgia.[65]

The 1970 election represented a watershed in Georgia's history, but the fact that Jimmy Carter won it did not. Had Carl Sanders won instead, it would have been a major turning point in the state's political history because both he and Carter were a new breed of political leaders emerging in the South at the time. Race as a campaign issue, at least as a public campaign issue, would have ended with a Sanders victory as surely as it did with Carter's victory.

What the 1970 election tells us about Georgia history, and about the Georgia segment of southern history, is not why but how race as a campaign issue came to an end there. Because of the state's peculiar political configuration at the time, the chances of an outsider appeared remote indeed. In the normal course of events the racially moderate, highly respected former governor Carl Sanders would have been pitted against a candidate of the Maddox/Wallace segregationist ilk. In such a contest Sanders might have won, purely on the strength of his record of sound and honest governance, but it would have been a hard fight and a narrow victory.

For anyone else, any newcomer, to stand a chance of winning the race, he would have had to steal Maddox's thunder and make himself, in fact if not in name, the candidate of the state's segregationist camp. At the same time, because Sanders' record was unassailable, any such newcomer would have had to bring the former governor down by tarring him with personal attacks.

The newcomer in this case was, of course, the personally honorable and politically liberal and integrationist-minded Jimmy Carter. No one but Jimmy Carter knew then, or knows now, how hard it was for him to decide to do what he had to

[64]First Maddox quote in *Atlanta Constitution*, September 24, 1970, 1; Maddox and Carter quotes at same meeting in *Atlanta Journal*, October 7, 1970, 1 and 18A; Carter will vote for Maddox in *Atlanta Constitution*, November 3, 1970, 6A.

[65]*Atlanta Constitution*, November 3, 1970, 6A, November 4, 1970.

do to win. But what is clear is that actually doing what he decided to do caused him great personal suffering. Thus, the most important thing the 1970 campaign reveals is an aspect of Jimmy Carter the man.

It was immediately obvious to others that Jimmy Carter had not run a campaign he could be proud of. Shortly after the election, state senator Leroy Johnson, Sanders' black campaign leader for the Atlanta area, made a poignant observation: "I understand why he ran that kind of ultra-conservative campaign . . . you have to do that to win. And that's the main thing. I don't believe you can win in this state without being a racist."[66]

But Carter had far more trouble justifying his actions to himself. After the election, Carter was distraught. He immediately telephoned Carl Sanders to apologize for the personal attacks, and began confiding to close friends that he "felt bad" about some of the things he had said and done. He confessed "to the Lord" and "prayed for forgiveness," and told Rosalynn that he would never go through such a campaign again. Six years later he opened his presidential campaign in 1976 with the slogan, "I'll never lie to you."[67]

In his now famous *Playboy* interview Carter said that when he looked on women with lust he was committing adultery in his heart. For born-again Jimmy Carter, the thought was equivalent to the action. *Playboy* interviewer Robert Sheer, commenting on the interview, noted that "Carter was addicted to the theory that we progress by stressing our virtues rather than dwelling on failures."[68]

In light of that, the question becomes, has Jimmy Carter admitted his failure and gone on beyond it? His continuing reluctance to discuss the 1970 campaign or to answer questions about it and his sequestering of his campaign papers all suggest that he has not. Judging from what few clues we have, Jimmy Carter probably has eased his moral dilemma by taking refuge in Reinhold Niebuhr's argument that in democracies perfection

[66]*Ibid.*, January 7, 1971, 10A.

[67]Howard Norton and Bob Slosser, *The Miracle of Jimmy Carter* (Plainfield, N.J., 1976), 74; James Wooten, *Dasher: The Roots and the Rising of Jimmy Carter* (New York, 1978), 295-96.

[68]Robert Scheer, "Jimmy We Hardly Know Y'all," *Playboy* (November 1976), 190; see also Carter interview by Scheer, in *ibid.*, 63-86.

is never possible and that the moral, i.e., Christian, man must content himself with accepting a necessary amount of compromise. Carter opened his autobiography, *Why Not the Best?* with the Niebuhr quotation: "The sad duty of politics is to establish justice in a sinful world."[69]

[69]Harry R. Davis and Robert C. Good, eds., *Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics* (New York, 1960), 180-81.