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# Lyndon Johnson and Richard Russell: Institutions, Ambitions and Civil Rights

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Richard Russell was “shocked and embittered” at the “complete surrender” of the 1960 Democratic party platform “to the NAACP and the other extreme radicals at Los Angeles.”<sup>1</sup> He believed that the Kennedy-Johnson ticket pandered to black voters by endorsing illegal sit-ins and the desegregation movement. Yet, in 1960, for the first time since 1936 Russell campaigned in the South for the Democratic ticket. As the southern leader wrote to a colleague, “when my friend Lyndon Johnson called me the third time and said that he was really in trouble and I could help, I stopped weighing issues and went.” Rarely did Russell stop “weighing issues,” and never did he do so in pursuit of his own political ambitions. By campaigning for Johnson he helped hold the South for the Democrats. As in the previous decade, the Johnson-Russell relationship had profound consequences for national politics. This study examines the Johnson-Russell relationship, and how each man dealt with the civil rights issue in the context of their relationship and their congressional and presidential ambitions.

In the two decades following World War II Georgia’s Senator Richard Russell, as Chairman of the Southern Caucus in the Senate, was the leader of a South whose core values were under attack. The southern racial-caste system, V. O. Key wrote in *Southern Politics*, rested on “the southern Senator and his actual, if not formal, right to veto proposals of national intervention to protect Negro rights.” Key continued, “on the fundamental issue, [race,] only the Federal government was to be feared.”<sup>3</sup> The white South had to act as a bloc and the Senate filibuster, with Russell in command of its use, remained the key to successful southern resistance to northern intrusion.

As the 81st Congress convened after the tumultuous elections of 1948, the Senate reverberated with southern concern over civil rights. Harry Truman was narrowly elected despite the walk-out of many deep-South delegates from the National Democratic convention and despite the presence in the general election of both former cabinet member Henry Wallace heading a left, Progressive Party ticket and Governors Fielding Wright of Mississippi and Strom Thurmond of South Carolina heading a right, States’ Rights Party ticket. Truman had sorely provoked the South when he sent the 80th Congress a civil rights legislative package, which included proposals to abolish the poll tax, create a Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC),

outlaw lynching, and abolish segregation in interstate transportation. This package was not his legislative “first goal” for the 81st Congress.<sup>4</sup> The previous year Clark Clifford, the President’s Counsel, advised Truman that the South had nowhere to go in the presidential election and it can “be considered safely Democratic.” Clifford fought for a hard-hitting program to differentiate the President from the Republicans. “The *only* pragmatic reason for conciliating the South in normal times,” he argued, “is because of its tremendous strength in the Congress. Since the Congress is Republican and the Democratic President has, therefore, no real chance to get his own program approved by it, particularly in an election year, he has no real necessity for ‘getting along’ with the Southern conservatives.”<sup>5</sup>

Richard Russell was outraged and “sick at heart” over Truman’s civil rights stance. He wrote to Strom Thurmond early in 1948, “In my opinion [the President] intends to press the matter until every power of the Federal Government is brought to bear to destroy segregation. . . .” Russell argued, the Democratic party always “represented states’ rights and white supremacy.” The party credo was being changed by the unions, the big-city bosses, the immigrants and the New Dealers. “It will be a great tragedy,” he concluded, “if we are driven from the house of our fathers by a bunch of Johnny-come-lately pink-tainted radicals who . . . now have control of our party. To supinely submit to the President’s program would be a greater tragedy.”<sup>6</sup> However, unlike Thurmond, Russell did not walk out of the convention. Instead, he allowed his name to be placed in nomination for the Presidency, because he “decided that those who were opposed to Mr. Truman were entitled to have someone for whom they could vote.”<sup>7</sup> Russell sat out the campaign at his home in Winder, Georgia and he remained publicly silent about his choice for President.

Race was rarely a focal point of politics in Lyndon Johnson’s Texas, but Coke Stevenson, Johnson’s major opponent in the 1948 contest for an open Senate seat, made racism a part of his campaign.<sup>8</sup> In reaction to Stevenson’s rhetoric LBJ denounced the President’s “civil rights program [as] a farce and a sham—an effort to set up a police state in the guise of liberty.”<sup>9</sup> Yet, when the Truman campaign train came through Texas, Johnson was aboard. National black leaders such as Mary McLeod Bethune and Robert Weaver urged blacks to vote for Johnson. Although LBJ had voted against every civil rights bill to come before him as a House member, he treated blacks fairly and he supported programs for the poor.<sup>10</sup> One black Texas newspaper editorial summed up the black view of Johnson: “Though he is no angel, he is about as good as we have seen in the race.”<sup>11</sup> Johnson won the election by only 87 votes, and he heavily carried the big city black vote.

Despite his support by black voters, Johnson quickly moved to establish strong ties with Russell and the other members of the southern delegation. This was critical to his future position within the Senate. Russell was a master of the Senate, and the southerners formed a powerful bloc within the chamber. “I knew there was only one way to see Russell every day,” recalled Johnson, “and that was to get a seat on his committee. Without that we’d most likely be acquaintances and nothing more.”<sup>12</sup> At Johnson’s behest, Representative Carl Vinson of Georgia, the Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee on which Johnson had served, intervened to have

LBJ placed on the Senate Armed Services Committee, where Russell sat as the ranking Democrat. Johnson next maneuvered to have Russell, a bachelor who lived alone in Washington, become part of the Johnson family. The Georgia Senator, upon LBJ's request, became a regular Sunday visitor to the Johnson household. Lady Bird Johnson recalls, "early in our Senate years he became part of the pattern of our lives." Russell readily took to the Johnson girls who, prodded by their father, called him "uncle." By mid-1949 Russell and the Johnsons exchanged gifts, and Russell soon acknowledged his friendship for the Texan.<sup>13</sup> Mrs. Johnson recalls, "[Lyndon] was a great friend of Dick Russell's. I'm sure there was nobody he admired more."<sup>14</sup> Famed Senate reporter William S. White notes, "The association between the two became, in fact, one of the most important of all Senate realities."<sup>15</sup>

Johnson's maiden speech on the Senate floor, made with Russell's prior approval, established his bona fides with the South. The Texan took the floor on March 9, 1949 and gave a defense of the right to filibuster and the southern view of civil rights. He opposed changing Rule XXII because "this is not the way to accomplish what so many want to do for the Negro race." The liberals, he argued, are intent on "depriving one minority [the South] of its rights in order to extend rights to other minorities." He opposed poll taxes, lynching, and racial discrimination in employment. However, he maintained, under the Constitution these were solely state matters, and Truman's proposals "would necessitate a system of Federal police officers such as we have never before seen."<sup>16</sup>

Johnson had asked James Rowe, a long-time ally and Roosevelt political appointee, to help draft his speech. But Rowe admonished Johnson about his turn towards racism. "Your old friends, who remember the high-stepping, idealistic, intelligent, young man who came here as a bright new Congressman in 1937 expect more of you than that. . . ." Rowe concluded, "someone like you had better grab hold of [the civil rights issue] and if you can get even 20% of it solved in the next 20 years you will be one of the great men of American history."<sup>17</sup> Johnson replied, "I want all men to have equal opportunity," but the Truman proposals were too liberal. LBJ argued, we need a "frontal assault on the 'ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-fed' problem facing our nation. Until this problem is met all your other legislation is built upon sand."<sup>18</sup> Rowe, however, would not countenance LBJ's refusal to acknowledge civil rights as a legitimate issue and he called the Texan "medieval." LBJ gave his speech and ended this correspondence with Rowe.<sup>19</sup>

Texas' black leaders reacted adversely to LBJ's speech, and he wrote to one NAACP Texas activist, "[It is] a profound regret to me that many Negro citizens of Texas have viewed my speech in the Senate as an affront to them."<sup>20</sup> Yet, he did not apologize for his speech, or indicate any regret about its content. Nor did he alter his "nay" votes on liberalizing Rule XXII or supporting civil rights. The San Antonio branch of the NAACP reproached Johnson in 1950 for his anti-civil rights record and scolded him for not understanding blacks were "being denied the rights of first-class citizenship." The Senator responded, "First-class citizenship begins at the meal table, in the school, at the doctor's office. . . ."<sup>21</sup> LBJ told a group of black, Texas businessmen, "[He] was not going to stick his neck out to do anything for

Negroes and get defeated.”<sup>22</sup> Support for the economic underdog had a long established following in the South; civil rights was a political loser.

As Johnson established himself in the Senate, Russell, with his distinguished record on defense issues, established himself in the broader national limelight. From mid-1951 onwards, stories appeared in the press that he was likely to make a serious bid for the presidency in 1952. In February of 1952, Russell officially announced that he was a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination. He never mentioned civil rights in his statement of candidacy, but he did mention “local self-government,” as one of the major “Jeffersonian Principles” at the heart of his platform.<sup>23</sup> His candidacy placed him on the front cover of *Time* magazine, but he wrote to the Atlanta Bureau Chief that he objected to the “‘sectional’ label” placed on him in the story.<sup>24</sup> But, he wrote to one southern newspaper editor, “I have no overwhelming desire to become a candidate for the Presidency. I am, however, firmly convinced that unless the South presents a united front, the bidding for minority votes will destroy our institutions and way of life.”<sup>25</sup> After the Democratic national convention was over and Adlai Stevenson had captured the party nomination, Russell wrote to one ally, “The primary purpose of my candidacy” was to bring before the nation “the principles in which the Southern Democracy believes.”<sup>26</sup> Yet, he believed he had a chance to become the choice of “the bosses of the big states who cater to the pressure groups . . . if things break right they will be for me, for they are always looking for the winner.”<sup>27</sup>

Russell, however, could not be a winner in northern eyes even after he decisively defeated Estes Kefauver in the Florida primary election. During the Florida contest Kefauver pledged that he would support a proposed Democratic civil rights plank, while Russell declared he would not accept such a plank. The liberal forces, as a consequence, made it clear that they would not accept Russell on the party ticket. They needed the black votes in their home states and any Democrat who threatened that vote base had to be rejected.<sup>28</sup> Prior to the 1952 Democratic National Convention, President Truman told Russell, “You know the left wing groups in Chicago, New York, St. Louis and Kansas City must be kept in the Democratic Party if we are to win and they will not vote for you.”<sup>29</sup> The Georgian could no longer be considered a serious presidential aspirant.

Russell still had his bases of power as Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and leader of the South. Time and again he was asked to become the Democratic Senate Leader, but he never took this pathway to power. He wrote to one political ally, “I have no desire whatever to serve in that connection. I could not accept any position that would jeopardize my independence of thought and action and I have consistently declined to be considered for this position.”<sup>30</sup> The Georgian did not want to be constrained by the expectation that as Senate Leader he should take policy positions consistent with the preference of the majority of the party caucus or that he should be the President’s advocate within the Senate.<sup>31</sup> Russell’s vision of domestic policy remained sectional.

Early in his Senate career Johnson’s vision and power rested on his southern connections; but his ties to the South became only one of his many links to power

as his career matured. After the Senate Democratic Whip, Francis Myers of Pennsylvania, was defeated in his 1950 Senate reelection bid, Russell intervened at Johnson's request and helped him obtain the Whip position.<sup>32</sup> Soon after the 1952 elections were over, Johnson asked for and received Russell's support to secure the Democratic leader's position which came open as a result of the defeat of Senate Democratic Leader Ernest McFarland of Arizona. One Senate scholar wrote, "He [LBJ] and Russell were on the telephone all night long, and he had the job."<sup>33</sup> On January 3, 1953 Johnson was officially elected Democratic Leader. A day earlier he wrote to his mentor, "My few years in the Senate have been rich and rewarding in experience and I have many fond memories. But of them all, the greatest is our friendship and how much your kindness meant to me. . . ."<sup>34</sup> On the wall of the new Leader's office there hung a large picture of Richard Russell standing in the doorway of his Georgia law office.

As minority Leader and, after 1954, Majority Leader, Johnson looked to Russell and his fellow southerners for support. Richard Nixon, the Senate's Presiding Officer from 1953 through 1960, recalls that Johnson almost always "had Russell as his own—very closest adviser. I don't think Johnson made a move on any very major issue without talking to Dick Russell."<sup>35</sup> William S. White notes, the southerners "had not only affection for Johnson, they also had a paternal interest in him and a curiously mixed and modified regional pride in him."<sup>36</sup> LBJ achieved a fine balance between his need to be one of the South's own, and his need to reflect the broader interests of the Democratic caucus.

Johnson transformed the Democratic Leader's position into a powerful institution. One of his first acts, with the prior agreement of Richard Russell, was to persuade the Democratic Steering Committee to allow freshman Senators to have an appointment to one major committee before a senior member would be given a second major committee appointment. Newly elected liberals such as Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota, Mike Mansfield of Montana, Herbert Lehman of New York, John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts and Stuart Symington of Missouri all received choice committee assignments, and all were indebted to the party Leader.<sup>37</sup> LBJ often found a compromise position on issues that crossed traditional, ideological divides. In one instance that particularly pained Joseph Rauh, a stalwart liberal and former chairman of the Americans for Democratic Action, Johnson "persuaded Hubert Humphrey to persuade the liberals not to make the fight [on Rule XXII in 1956]." Rauh concluded, "The people who are supposed to tell you to go further, go back and tell [you] . . . they really don't want to go that far and that he's [LBJ] getting them the best deal possible."<sup>38</sup> This was LBJ's genius.

Johnson's ability at compromise was put to its sternest test when the Democratic alliance grappled with civil rights in the wake of the Supreme Court's *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas* decision. Richard Russell was the first of many southerners who took to the Senate floor to denounce this "flagrant abuse of judicial power" and "clear invasion of the legislative branch." This decision, Russell argued, was "the most dangerous perversion of power in the Court's history."<sup>39</sup> By contrast, Johnson acknowledged, "the decision is an accomplished fact. . . . It cannot be

overruled now, and it is possible that it can never be overruled. Second,” the Senate Leader continued, “the Supreme Court in its ruling has recognized the complexity of the problem. It has delayed the actual decree that will turn a general ruling into a specific order.” Johnson believed, “our people [will] work this matter out within the boundaries of the Supreme Court decision and in a manner that will be satisfying to both races.”<sup>40</sup> The *Brown* decision was the law of the land, and that, the Leader maintained, meant it had to be obeyed. Johnson was the party steward: he had to moderate the ideology of race so that it did not tear the Democrats apart.

When the Supreme Court issued the desegregation guidelines in *Brown II* on May 31, 1955, it allowed for integration “with all deliberate speed.” The southerners were outraged. In the Senate, Richard Russell, after discussion with Senators Sam Ervin of North Carolina and John C. Stennis of Mississippi, wrote the final draft of “The Declaration of Constitutional Principles,” popularly known as the Southern Manifesto. It attacked the *Brown* decision as “a clear abuse of judicial power” and promised “to use all lawful means to bring about a reversal of this decision which was contrary to the Constitution.”<sup>41</sup> In much of the South, “the political atmosphere is such,” wrote Harry Ashmore, editor of the *Arkansas Gazette*, “that any public man who urges compliance [with *Brown*] is doomed to defeat.”<sup>42</sup>

Only three southern Senators, Estes Kefauver and Albert Gore of Tennessee, and Lyndon Johnson of Texas refused to sign the document. Gore and Kefauver were roundly condemned in the South. Johnson declared he could not sign the Manifesto because, as Majority Leader, he could not place himself in opposition to the law of the land.<sup>43</sup> “Dick Russell,” Strom Thurmond also recalled, “told us that Johnson couldn’t sign it because he was the majority leader.”<sup>44</sup> Mississippi’s John Stennis, a fervent segregationist recalled, “Just Senator to Senator, of course, we wanted him to sign it, but at the same time we recognized that he wasn’t just a Senator from Texas. He was a leader and had a different responsibility to that degree.” Stennis concluded, “It wasn’t held against him . . . by the Southerners.”<sup>45</sup> Russell now promoted LBJ as a man who would make “an infinitely better President than any of the present . . . candidates, and his views are much closer to mine than any of the other candidates.”<sup>46</sup> Some Texans, however, were unhappy with their Senator’s reluctance to stand with the South. LBJ told these constituents he had never voted for any “so-called civil rights bill” and that he “had lived in the South all his life, and both of [his] grandparents fought on the Confederate side in the War Between the States.”<sup>47</sup> Sixteen of the twenty-two members of the Texas House delegation, including Speaker Sam Rayburn, also refused to sign the document. Every Georgia congressman signed the Manifesto.

Johnson’s civil rights stance gained him favorable national attention. LBJ’s picture appeared on the cover of *Time* magazine. The *Washington Post’s* publisher, Philip L. Graham, argued that LBJ was the possible future President “who could heal the [regional] divisions within the country.”<sup>48</sup> LBJ, with the help of the civil rights issue, was now a publicly visible, national leader.

The 1956 presidential election hastened the development of civil rights legislative proposals. The GOP White House, at least partly in an attempt to woo black voters,

drew up a civil rights legislative package which reached the Senate in July of 1956. To avoid an intra-party fight LBJ took Russell's advice and sent the proposals to Senator Eastland's Judiciary Committee where they remained for the rest of the session.<sup>47</sup> After the election, Eisenhower, having won a higher percentage of the black vote than any GOP presidential nominee since Alf Landon, reintroduced a civil rights bill.

Lyndon Johnson and his staff were acutely aware of the black vote shift. Harry McPherson, a trusted LBJ aide, maintains this was a key factor that led LBJ to support civil rights legislation in 1957.<sup>50</sup> George Reedy, another long-term Johnson Senate staffer, told LBJ he had to provide the "moderate leadership" for a broadly acceptable bill. If LBJ could get the "edge taken off the civil rights issue, the Democratic Party could then fall back on economic issues where, with Negro voters, it has a decided advantage."<sup>51</sup> Johnson wrote to a friend, "we are going to have the civil rights controversy with us for many years. However it may have started, it has now gone beyond the point where it can be called off." The Texan later told Doris Kearns, his biographer, "the Senate simply had to act, and I simply had to act; the issue would wait no longer."<sup>52</sup>

The White House proposals would: (I) create a fact-finding Civil Rights Commission; (II) create a civil rights division in the Department of Justice; (III) grant injunctive powers to Federal court judges in cases involving civil rights violations; and (IV) grant injunctive powers to Federal court judges in cases involving voting rights violations. Part III of the proposals outraged the southerners, with its broad application to civil rights violations. Part IV bothered the South, but they believed that a jury trial provision would ameliorate its impact. Russell wrote, these proposals were "cunningly designed to vest in the Attorney General unprecedented power to bring to bear the whole might of the Federal government, including the armed forces, if necessary to force a commingling of white and Negro children. . . ."<sup>53</sup> Russell joined Johnson to indelibly alter the administration's civil rights proposals, but the two leaders were allies with different perspectives. Russell was concerned that with a Republican President backing the legislation, and northern agitation growing rapidly, the traditional Republican linkage of civil rights with concern for states' rights was sure to erode. "I have never seen such hysteria as surrounds this legislation," the Georgian wrote. "Men will not listen to reason. . . ."<sup>54</sup>

Johnson's concern was to mold a legislative package that would be acceptable to the North and not viewed as an anathema to the South. This would keep his party together, enhance his image and improve his chance for the Presidency. LBJ's subsequent maneuvering, and the consequent Senate recreation of the Eisenhower proposals are political legend. LBJ molded the legislation into a mild voting rights bill. George Reedy had advised LBJ, "It would be possible to pass a civil rights bill if you limited it to voting rights. [Southerners] really do believe in the Constitution as written. . . . it was clearly unconstitutional to deprive these blacks of their votes. And the Southerners know that." LBJ told Hubert Humphrey, "the right to vote with no ifs, and, or buts, that's the key. When the Negro gets that, they'll have every politician, north and south . . . begging for their support."<sup>55</sup> This would be Johnson's way to achieve a moderate, compromise civil rights bill.



Johnson and Russell worked in tandem to transform the White House proposals. They convinced the southerners to accept the inevitability of a “mild” civil rights bill, or a much stiffer piece of legislation was going to be “crammed down their throats.” In the end, with the exception of Strom Thurmond, the southerners agreed to forego a filibuster if Part III of the bill was eliminated and if a jury trial amendment was added to Part IV.<sup>56</sup> During the Senate debate, Russell played to Republican fears of Federal intrusion into local affairs. Part III he argued, “could result in placing many southern communities under martial law if they should fail to submit to what they regard as the destruction of their society. . . .”<sup>57</sup> LBJ then arranged for Eisenhower to invite Russell to the White House for a discussion of Part III. The President assured the Georgian, “The overriding provision of the bill that he wanted to set down in law [was] the citizen’s right to vote.” Upon leaving the mansion, Russell told the press, “The President’s mind was not closed to possible amendments to clarify the bill.” Soon after this meeting, Eisenhower was asked at a press conference about his view of Part III. His response devastated the civil rights liberals: “I was reading part of that bill this morning,” said the President, “and there were certain phrases I didn’t completely understand. So, before I make any remarks on that, I would want to talk to the Attorney General and see exactly what they mean.”<sup>58</sup> The President never again publicly supported Part III. Minority leader Everett Dirksen of Illinois, now concluded his almost “endless meetings” with LBJ, and agreed to alter the bill so that what emerged “was not an extreme bill . . . but it did make a start in that whole civil rights picture.”<sup>59</sup> The GOP was in the Johnson fold.

LBJ reminisced about how he worked his persuasive powers with the western Democrats: “I began with the assumption that most of the Senators from the mountain states had never seen a Negro and simply couldn’t care all that much about the whole civil rights issue. But if they couldn’t care about the Negro, I knew what they did care about and that was the Hell’s Canyon issue.”<sup>60</sup> The Leader talked with the westerners and the southerners, and in the middle of the civil rights debate, with Russell’s approval and the votes of the southerners assured, enabling legislation for the Hell’s Canyon project was brought to the Senate floor and passed. The mountain state Democrats then joined with the Republicans and the southerners and by a vote of 52 to 38, Part III was eliminated.<sup>61</sup>

The Majority leader then turned his attention to the jury trial proposal. With the aide of a group of famed liberal lawyers—Dean Acheson, well known for his State Department work during the Truman years, and Ben Cohen and Abe Fortas, both New Deal stalwarts—Johnson argued that a judge should be able to impose only a limited fine or minor jail sentence for civil contempt citations. Severe penalties should be imposed only by a jury. To the consternation of civil rights advocates, John L. Lewis, the head of the coal miners union, and George Meaney, the President of the AFL-CIO, supported this proposal. They opposed the power of Federal judges to unilaterally issue contempt citations against union leaders who defied Federal strike injunction orders. They viewed the jury trial proposal as an extension of the union position. On August 1, the jury trial amendment passed the Senate by a 51 to 42 vote, with the South in support. Southern comment on Johnson’s stratagems was

triumphant. Harry F. Byrd of Virginia wrote to LBJ: "No one living but yourself could have accomplished what was done last night. It was due to your wonderful leadership and strategy." Russell told a long-time political ally. "[Johnson] did give us tremendous help on the jury trial amendment. We would have lost everything if he had not turned two or three liberals around in the Senate on it."<sup>62</sup>

Most of the southerners and a few ardent liberals voted against final passage of the reworked legislation, but the Johnson created alliance prevailed by a vote of 72 to 18. After minor Conference Committee modification of the jury trial section, the final bill passed the Senate on August 29 by a 60 to 15 vote. Eisenhower was "bitterly disappointed" by the Senate metamorphosis of the original civil rights package. "Rarely," he inveighed, ". . . have so many extraneous issues been introduced into the debate to confuse both the legislators and the public."<sup>63</sup> After much public and private debate, the President quietly signed the first civil rights act passed by Congress since Reconstruction. He believed it was at least a beginning place for black voting rights.<sup>64</sup>

Johnson's vote in favor of final passage was the first pro-civil rights vote cast by a Texas Senator since the end of Reconstruction, and he wrote to one critical constituent: "We cut out the notorious 'troops in the South' provision. We defeated a maneuver that would have given the President the authority to obtain an injunction that would place people in jeopardy of fines or jail sentences." He concluded, "What we have . . . now is a right-to-vote measure." He supported the Constitutional right to vote but he was opposed to any "so-called civil rights" bill.<sup>65</sup>

As imperfect as it was, from the South's perspective, the Johnson bill was far better than the proposal it replaced. Russell told a group of southern leaders, "The victory would help Johnson in his 1960 bid . . . to win the Democratic Presidential nomination."<sup>66</sup> The Georgian wrote to a constituent: "The great danger which faced us is an amendment which would bring back the power of the Federal government to move into our schools and mix the races there [Title III]. The elimination of that provision was my primary aim throughout the fight." He believed that the South "can handle our voting situation over a period of years. . . . but once the schools are mixed under federal domination our society is destroyed."<sup>67</sup> Thus, Johnson's maneuvers appeared to have saved the South from danger.

But as the legislative struggle over the Civil Rights Act came to a close, the confrontation over "race-mixing" in Little Rock's Central High School began as the President called out Federal troops to enforce the court ordered desegregation of Little Rock Central High School. Russell protested to the President and the Secretary of Defense, "[against] the high-handed and illegal methods being deployed by the Armed Forces of the United States under your command who are carrying out your orders to mix the races in the public schools of Little Rock Arkansas." He resorted to histrionics and argued: "The troops are . . . applying tactics which must have been copied from the manual issued the officers of Hitler's Storm Troopers."<sup>68</sup> The Georgian sent his constituents message after message inveighing against the "President's actions in copying the Storm Troopers tactics which brought Hitler to power."<sup>69</sup> The patrician Georgian had become a demagogue.

Johnson, by contrast, took to the Senate floor during the Little Rock crisis to note his concern that the situation “is filled with dangerous, emotional tension and marked by extremely complex questions.” He called “upon men of good will to act with restraint and with traditional American respect for law and order.”<sup>70</sup> In his correspondence with constituents LBJ never resorted to the use of inflammatory language and he argued for calm and understanding.<sup>71</sup> Harry Ashmore wrote in December of 1958, “The Southern leaders have [almost all] cut themselves off from the possibility of meaningful compromise; they have whipped their followers into a mood where any man who yields to any degree on the segregation issue invites immediate retaliation.”<sup>72</sup> Johnson, with Gore and Kefauver, was again among the few who defied the southern racist pattern.

Johnson’s ambitions, and the expectations that others held for him and his ambitions, kept moving him away from the South, but he remained aware of the region’s perspective. As the 86th Congress got underway, the liberals wanted to change Rule XXII to permit a simple majority of the Senate membership to close off debate after a bill was on the Senate floor for fifteen days. The Southerners threatened to filibuster if the motion was brought to the Senate floor.<sup>73</sup> Johnson, with the concurrence of Republican leader Everett Dirksen, proposed a compromise to alter Rule XXII by “striking out ‘two-thirds of the Senators duly chosen and sworn’ and inserting in its place, ‘two-thirds of the Senate present and voting.’”<sup>74</sup> After the more liberal proposals were defeated, the Johnson amendment to Rule XXII passed the Senate by a margin of seventy-two to twenty-two.<sup>75</sup>

Reaction to this Johnson maneuver was mixed. *The New York Times* understood that LBJ sought “to satisfy the pressure on Congress for a change in the filibuster rule without splitting his party in the process.”<sup>76</sup> Again the South was not unduly antagonized, while much of the North and the West were satisfied.<sup>77</sup> But the blacks and their allies were angry. Roy Wilkins, the NAACP Executive Director, called the Johnson modification of Rule XXII “a fraud in so far as it pretends to make possible the passage of civil rights legislation.” Furthermore, Wilkins asserted, if the Democrats wanted “Negro support” in the 1960 elections they would have to demonstrate that “effective civil rights legislation” could come out of the Senate.<sup>78</sup> The blacks were joined by an increasing number of liberal Democrats. Dean Acheson wrote the Senate Leader to “use his rare gifts of leadership and courage” to have the Senate again deal with civil rights. This was critical, he believed, for Democratic success in the 1960 Presidential elections.<sup>79</sup>

Johnson responded to these entreaties, and within days of his victory in the rules fight he introduced a civil rights measure. It was a mild measure, but it was also the first civil rights bill since Reconstruction to be introduced in the Congress by a Southerner.<sup>80</sup> The Johnson proposal would (1) establish a community relations service to mediate in racially tense communities; (2) extend the life of the Civil Rights Commission; (3) outlaw interstate transportation of explosives for purposes of violence or intimidation; and (4) extend to the Attorney General subpoena power in voting rights cases. The strong civil rights liberals saw the Johnson proposals as a palliative designed to forestall any real civil rights legislation.<sup>81</sup> Some of Johnson’s

constituents wrote to him of their indignation that a southerner would introduce civil rights legislation. He replied that this was “a reasonable proposal around which men of all sections of the country could rally. . . .” He wanted to take the issue away from “extremists” who believed in “forced integration and harsh, punitive legislation” and have it reflect what “men of reason” found acceptable.<sup>82</sup>

Two weeks after the Johnson proposals were introduced, the Eisenhower administration brought forward a set of new civil rights recommendations. The Eisenhower proposals: (1) made it a federal crime to interfere with a Federal court order involving school desegregation; (2) made it a federal crime to cross state lines to avoid prosecution for bombing a church or school; (3) required the preservation of federal voting records by state registrars and allowed the Attorney General to inspect these records; (4) established a Commission on Equal Job Opportunity for government contracts; and (5) extended the life of the Civil Rights Commission.<sup>83</sup> The White House recommendations were referred to Senator Eastland’s Judiciary Committee. However, by prearrangement, when Senator Jacob Javits of New York inquired about bringing civil rights legislation before the body in the next session, the Majority Leader replied: “I serve notice to all members that on or about 12 o’clock on February 15 [, 1960] I anticipate that some Senator will rise in his place and make a motion with regard to the general civil rights question.”<sup>84</sup>

On February 15, 1960 the Senate leader announced that a bill to allow the town of Stella, Missouri to use old army barracks as a temporary public school facility “has been selected as the one . . . to begin discussion of civil rights proposals. . . .” Using a parliamentary procedure to avoid sending the bill to Eastland’s Judiciary Committee, Johnson declared, “The bill is open to amendment,” and Dirksen introduced the administration’s 1959 proposals with two additions: technical assistance was to be provided to schools undergoing desegregation and Federal voting referees were to be appointed by Federal judges if a finding of racially-based voter registration discrimination was made by a Federal court. Dirksen was now Johnson’s key ally.<sup>85</sup>

Russell was appalled at Johnson’s tactic. It was the first time that LBJ had acted on a civil rights measure in a manner that was unacceptable to Russell. Johnson recalled Russell’s reaction: “he was rather cool, aloof and said, ‘Yes, I understand that you let them jockey you into that position. I understand.’ And a little later I reminded him again, and he said, ‘Yes, I know that. Go ahead, do whatever your judgement tells you. That’s your business, your responsibility. I’m not the leader.’” After Johnson made the motion to introduce the bill, his Georgian friend told the Senate, “You have just heard a motion that I thought would never be made in the Senate by the leader of my party.”<sup>86</sup> Russell denounced Johnson’s actions as a “lynching of orderly procedure,” and proceeded to lead a filibuster.<sup>87</sup> It was the first public division between the two men. The Eisenhower legislative package, with the Federal Contracts Commission section deleted, passed the House on March 24.<sup>88</sup> Russell led eighteen southerners in a filibuster of the measure. This proceeded for over five weeks when Johnson persuaded Russell to allow the Senate to work its will in having the House bill sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee with a proviso that it be reported back to the full Senate no later than midnight, March 29.<sup>89</sup> When the

civil rights package returned to the Senate floor intact, the Republicans joined LBJ and the southerners to defeat all strengthening amendments.<sup>90</sup> After the demolition of the liberal proposals was complete, Dirksen announced that the President and the Attorney General were “quite happy with the bill.” On April 8, with only eighteen southerners and a few northern liberals opposed, the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1960 passed the Senate with 71 aye votes.<sup>91</sup> Johnson believed, “I got the best bill I could with the votes I had, and if they could have gotten a better bill, we would have gotten it.”<sup>92</sup> This was another bill the South and the North would accept. LBJ told his constituents this bill was a “victory for fair play.”<sup>93</sup>

Johnson minimized the political fall-out from congressional involvement with civil rights in the the 1950s. One result of this was relative intra-party cohesion for the Democrats. In addition, no politician got hurt too much by the 1957 and 1960 civil rights bills, but little progress was gained for black civil rights either.<sup>94</sup> On the other hand, Theodore White notes, “The fact that the subject is open to reasonable discussion and minimally open to legislative management, however cautious, is Johnson’s achievement.”<sup>95</sup> Johnson maintained his ties to Russell and the South, while expanding his alliances in the North and West. He gained credibility as a leader and, although he was opposed by the more committed liberals, he became the Democratic vice presidential nominee in 1960.<sup>96</sup>

During his vice presidential years Johnson moved solidly into the desegregationist camp, while Russell remained the strident, southern Senate leader. For example, in reaction to the 1963 Birmingham demonstrations and Kennedy’s 1963 civil rights bill, Russell wrote to a fellow southerner, “all my sympathies are with Alabama in the present outrageous situation. . . . the Kennedy Administration is preparing some new civil rights legislation that will do more violence to the fabric of Constitutional government than any we have seen heretofore.”<sup>97</sup> “We have come to evil days,” he wrote to another ally, “and with both major political parties trying to outbid each other for the Negro bloc vote in the big cities, it seems that our Constitution is being discarded.”<sup>98</sup> By contrast, Johnson’s 1963 Memorial Day speech at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania made front page headlines across the nation because of its liberalism. “One hundred years [after the battle of Gettysburg] . . . the Negro remains in bondage to the color of his skin.” Johnson continued, “The Negro today asks justice. We do not answer him— we do not answer those who lie beneath this soil—when we reply to the Negro by asking, patience.”<sup>99</sup> Much as Russell maintained his commitment to the old South, Johnson departed from the southern racial byways.

Within days of his assumption of the Presidency, Johnson made a nationally televised speech before a joint session of the Congress affirming his commitment to civil rights: “We have talked long enough in this country about equal rights. . . . It is time now to write the next chapter—and to write it in the books of law.”<sup>100</sup> Johnson had concluded, “if I didn’t get out on front on this issue they [the liberals] would get me. . . . I had to produce a civil rights bill even stronger than the one they’d have gotten if Kennedy had lived.”<sup>101</sup> On the day that Johnson made his speech to the Congress Russell wrote to a Georgia friend, “I am afraid we are in for a hard time, as President Johnson seems to be committed to pushing every aspect of the

Kennedy program.”<sup>102</sup> Russell now played a key role in Johnson’s strategic thinking about how to handle civil rights legislation—as an opponent.<sup>103</sup> Russell led the southern forces in the longest filibuster ever conducted on the floor of the Senate but the President committed his party to staying the course, and the civil rights forces prevailed.

The ties between the two long-time friends became tenuous, and eventually broke apart over the issue of civil rights. In 1964, although he voted for the Democratic ticket, as he always had, the Georgian did not campaign for his party.<sup>104</sup> He could not urge “support of a platform” calling for civil rights enforcement. In his eyes, this was a call for the destruction “of our constitutional system.”<sup>105</sup> By the summer of 1965 Russell wrote of Johnson’s civil rights views, “Our opinions are so completely at variance we do not discuss what I regard as his extreme position on this issue.” The Texan was surrounded with “extreme left-wingers.”<sup>106</sup> As Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and a friend Russell still came to the White House.

In the spring of 1968, the Johnson-Russell friendship ended after LBJ yielded to pressure from Attorney General Ramsey Clark and civil rights leaders, and held up Russell’s nominee for Federal judgeship, Alexander Lawrence. Lawrence was a southern traditionalist on racial matters, but Russell had expected the nomination to go forward under Johnson’s guidance, and he was embittered by the turn matters took.<sup>107</sup> Russell and Johnson never met again as friends, and when Russell died in 1971 LBJ did not attend his funeral.<sup>108</sup>

Richard Russell and Lyndon Johnson pursued divergent political paths as they each grappled with personal ambitions and differing perspectives on civil rights. Russell would not venture where Johnson went. The Georgian did not broaden his perspective on civil rights beyond the South. Of course, it would have been politically difficult, perhaps impossible, for Russell to temper his racial positions, given the nature of his Georgia constituency. But, even as a presidential aspirant he remained a southerner. His ambitions were limited by his inability to move beyond the Southern perspective.

Although LBJ was sympathetic to the plight of blacks, he never let that sympathy move him to support black rights until it was politically advantageous to do so. He was the rational politician who would “act solely in order to attain the income, prestige, and power which comes from being in office.”<sup>109</sup> He was the ambitious politician who “must act today in terms of the office which he seeks to win tomorrow.”<sup>110</sup> Johnson moved with the civil rights issue, and he used the issue within the framework of his institutional position and his ambition. As he moved up the ladder of politics his perspective broadened. Lyndon Johnson evolved from an east Texas politician and junior Senator who opposed civil rights legislation into a committed politician and President who led his party and the nation as they grappled with the issue.

### *Notes*

1. Richard Russell to John J. Jones July 18, 1960, Russell Papers, dictation Series, IC2. Richard B. Russell Memorial Library, Athens, Georgia. Hereafter, references to this library are cited as RL.

2. Richard Russell to Charles A. Rowland, December 17, 1960, Richard Russell Papers, Dictation Series, IC2. RL.
3. V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), pp. 8–9. See also: William G. Carleton, “The Southern Politician, 1920–1940,” *Journal of Politics*, 13 (May, 1951), 215–31.
4. *Public Papers of the President, Harry S. Truman, 1948* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1966), 3, 121–26.
5. Clark Clifford to Harry S. Truman, November 19, 1947, Clifford Papers, Political Files. HSTL.
6. Richard Russell to J. Strom Thurmond, February 17, 1948, Russell Papers, Civil Rights Dictation Series, X:45. RL.
7. Richard Russell to Elizabeth Cadwallier-Noyes, September 31, 1948, Russell Papers, Civil Rights Series, X:163. RL.
8. Billington, pp. 34–6.
9. Lyndon B. Johnson, Speech in Austin, Texas, May 22, 1948, Lyndon Baines Johnson Papers, Statements of Lyndon B. Johnson, Volume I, Box 1. Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas. Hereafter, all references to this collection are noted as: LBJL. Johnson made other anti-civil rights speeches in: Texarkana, on May 22, 1948; Sherman, on July 18, 1948; Waco, on July 20, 1948; San Antonio, on August 13, 1948; and Fort Worth, on August 19, 1948. Copies of these speeches may all be found in the same location as above.
10. Monroe Billington, “Lyndon B. Johnson and Blacks: The Early Years,” *Journal of Negro History*, 62 (January, 1977), 26–42.
11. Dyer, p. 70.
12. Johnson quoted in: Ronnie Dugger, *The Politician, The Life and Times of Lyndon Johnson, The Drive for Power—from the Frontier to Master of the Senate* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982), p. 343.
13. Richard B. Russell to Lyndon Johnson, November 25, 1949, Personal File, Dictation Series, Russell Papers. RL.
14. Claudia T. (Lady Bird) Johnson, June 28, 1977 oral history interview by Hugh Cates, 3, 8. LBJL. See also: Kearns, p. 110. George E. Reedy, a long-time LBJ aide, argues that Sam Rayburn also viewed Johnson in this light. See: Reedy, *Lyndon B. Johnson: A Memoir* (New York: Andrews and McMeel, 1982), p. 43.
15. White, p. 169.
16. *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 2041–49.
17. James H. Rowe to Lyndon B. Johnson, February 23, 1949, Johnson Papers, Civil Rights, United States Senate, 1949–1961, Box 1. LBJL.
18. Lyndon B. Johnson to James H. Rowe, March 15, 1949. In subsequent correspondence Rowe refers to LBJ’s arguments as “medieval,” and Johnson finally terminates this interchange with the comment: “We are both dogmatic, both sure we are right. . . .” See: Rowe to Johnson, April 18, 1949; and Johnson to Rowe, April 22, 1949. This correspondence may all be found in: Johnson Papers, Civil Rights, United States Senate, 1949–1961, Box 1. LBJL.
19. James Rowe to Lyndon Johnson, April 18, 1949; Lyndon Johnson to James Rowe, April 22, 1949, Johnson Papers, Civil Rights, United States Senate, 1949–1961, Box 1. LBJL.
20. The quotation is from Lyndon Johnson to A. E. Holland, March 2, 1949, Johnson Papers, Pre-Presidential Papers, Box 1. LBJL.
21. “Resolution on Civil Rights,” San Antonio Branch, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, January 6, 1950; Lyndon Johnson to Harry V. Burns, January 18, 1950, Johnson Papers, Pre-Presidential Papers, Box 2. LBJL.
22. Carter Wesley, *Houston Informer*, February 6, 1954.
23. *New York Times*, February 29, 1952.
24. Richard Russell to William S. Howland, Russell Papers, Dictation Series, IC4. RL.
25. Richard Russell to T. R. Waring, January 24, 1952, Russell Papers, Dictation Series, IC4. RL. See also: Richard Russell to Max Lockwood, January 24, 1952, *Ibid*.

26. Richard Russell to Dawson Kea, September 26, 1953, Russell Papers, Dictation Series, IC4. RL.
27. Richard Russell to Burton K. Wheeler, April 5, 1952; Richard Russell to John Carroll, July 3, 1952, Russell Papers, Dictation File, IC4. RL.
28. *New York Times*, April 28, 1952; May 14, 1952; June 22 and June 23, 1952.
29. Richard Russell, Memorandum on 3:00 Discussion with President Truman, June 10, 1952, Russell Papers, Political Series, VI, Winder. RL.
30. Richard Russell to Ernest H. Broughton, November 14, 1950, Russell Papers, Political Series, VI:31. RL.
31. Richard Russell to G. P. Martin, January 3, 1951, Political File, Dictation Series, Russell Papers, RL. On the continued prevalence of this Senate norm see: Randall B. Ripley, *Congress, Process and Policy*, 4th ed. (N. Y.: W. W. Norton, 1988), p. 187.
32. Leslie Carpenter, "Whip from Texas," *Colliers*, February 17, 1951; Richard Russell to John Sparkman, December 1, 1950, Russell Papers, Political Series, VI:31. RL.
33. *New York Times*, November 11, 1952. Ralph Huitt quoted in Miller, p. 154. See also: Bobby Baker in Miller, p. 154; Russell's handwritten notes in support of LBJ's Senate leadership candidacy: "Russell Remarks, January 2, 1953," Johnson Papers, Papers of the Democratic Leader Files, Box 364. LBJL.
34. Lyndon Johnson to Richard Russell, January 2, 1953, Johnson Papers, Johnson Senate File, "Master File Index," Box 162. LBJL.
35. Richard M. Nixon, April 13, 1978 oral history interview by Hugh Cates and Robert G. Stephens, Jr., 16. RL. See also: Robert Troutman, Jr., March 4, 1971 oral history interview by Hugh Cates, 22. RL.
36. White, 199.
37. Reedy, *Memoir*, p. xiii; Evans and Novak, pp. 63-4; John G. Stewart, "Two Strategies of Leadership, Johnson and Mansfield," in Nelson W. Polsby, ed., *Congressional Behavior* (New York: Random House, 1971), esp. p. 61; Ralph K. Huitt, "Democratic Party Leadership in the Senate," *American Political Science Review*, 55 (June, 1961), 338; James L. Sundquist, *Politics and Policy, The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution), p. 400.
38. Joseph L. Rauh, July 30, 1969 oral history interview. I-14, 19. LBJL.
39. Press release of Richard Russell, May 17, 1954 reprinted in *Congressional Record*, 83rd Cong, 2nd Sess., May 18, 1954, 6750.
40. Speech on Floor of Senate, May 18, 1954, Johnson Papers, Statements of Lyndon Johnson, 1948-August 2, 1957, Vol. II, Box 2.
41. "The Declaration of Constitutional Principles," and Senate commentary on the statement, may be found in: *Congressional Record*, 84th Cong., 2nd sess., March 12, 1956, 4459-60. On the authorship of the manifesto, see: Richard Russell to M. Hayes Mizell, April 13, 1962, Russell Papers, Dictation Series, X:299. RL. Russell's text of the manifesto may be found in: Russell Papers, Speech/Media Series, III:33. RL.
42. Harry S. Ashmore to Adlai E. Stevenson, August 2, 1956, Adlai E. Stevenson Papers, Box 425. PUL.
43. *New York Times*, March 12, 1956.
44. Strom Thurmond, oral history interview by Michael Gillette, June 17, 1972, I-11. LBJL.
45. *New York Times*, March 13, 1956. John Stennis quoted in: Miller, p. 188.
46. Richard Russell to W. H. Bridges, March 27, 1956, Early Office Series, Russell Papers, IV: 199. RL.
47. Lyndon Johnson to Charles L. Hatcher, May 18, 1956, Johnson Papers, Civil Rights, United States Senate, 1949-1961, Box 7. LBJL.
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49. *New York Times*, July 30, 1956.
  50. Harry McPherson, *A Political Education* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), p. 142.
  51. George Reedy to Lyndon Johnson, December 3, 1956, Civil Rights, U.S. Senate, 1949–1961, Johnson Papers, Box 7. LBJL; Alfred Steinberg, *Sam Johnson's Boy* (New York: MacMillan, 1968), p. 467. See also: Harry McPherson, "Johnson and Civil Rights," in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed., *Portraits of American Presidents, Twenty Intimate Perspectives of Lyndon B. Johnson* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1986), p. 57; Harry McPherson, December 5, 1963, oral history interview by T. H. Baker, 13. LBJL.
  52. Lyndon Johnson to Allen Duckworth, March 9, 1957, Johnson Papers, Civil Rights, United States Senate, 1949–1961, Box 2. LBJL; Kearns, p. 147. The best study of LBJ's role in the 1957 Civil Rights Act legislative fight may be found in: Evans and Novak, pp. 119–40. 52.
  53. Richard Russell, *Congressional Record*, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., July 2, 1957, 1077.
  54. Richard Russell to R. Carter Pittman, June 18, 1957, Russell Papers, Civil Rights Series, X: 82. RL.
  55. Humphrey quoted in: Miller, p. 371; Reedy in: Miller, p. 206.
  56. *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, March 30, 1956, 1393. Richard H. Rovere, "Letter from Washington," *New Yorker*, August 31, 1957, 72. Staff Memorandum, n.d., Johnson Papers, Civil Rights, U.S. Senate, 1949–1961, Box 3. LBJL.
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  58. The first Eisenhower quote is from: Peter Lyon, *Eisenhower: Portrait of the Hero* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), p. 74; Russell's Senate comments may be found in: *Congressional Record*, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., July 2, 1957, 10771–74; July 10, 1957, 11291–94; July 22, 1957, 12287–92; *New York Times*, July 11, 1957. Eisenhower's second statement may be found in: *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 52. Hereafter, this source is cited as: *PPP:DDE* with the appropriate year in the title.
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  61. *New York Times*, July 25, 1957.
  62. Evans and Novak, as cited above, provide the story of this maneuvering. *Congressional Record*, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., August 1, 1957, 13355–6; Harry F. Byrd to Lyndon Johnson, August 2, 1957, Johnson Papers, Senate Files, Congressional Correspondence, Box 4. LBJL; Transcript, "Senator Russell's conversation with Carter Pittman," September 2, 1957, Russell Papers, Dictation Series, IF2. RL. See also: Richard Russell to Roy V. Harris, August 9, 1957, Russell Papers, Civil Rights Series, X: 84. RL.
  63. *Congressional Record*, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 16112, 16477–8, 16784; *PPP:DDE*, 1957, p. 587.
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  65. Lyndon Johnson to George B. Fleming, July 29, 1957, Johnson Papers, Civil Rights, U.S. Senate, 1949–1961, Box 3. Much of this correspondence may be found in Box 2 of the Johnson Senate Civil Rights collection.
  66. Russell belief quoted by Strom Thurmond in: *C. Q. Guide to American Government, Spring, 1988* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1988), p. 43.
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  68. Richard Russell, to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, September 26, 1957, Richard Russell to Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, September 26, 1957, Russell Papers, Dictation Series. IF2. RL.
  69. Richard Russell. Press Release, September 24, 1957, Russell Papers, Civil Rights Series, X:52;

- Richard Russell, Book Telegram, September 27, 1957, Russell Papers, Civil Rights Series, X: 83. RL.
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  73. *New York Times*, January 10, 1959.
  74. *Congressional Record*, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 6.
  75. *New York Times*, January 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 1959.
  76. *New York Times*, January 10, 1959.
  77. Richard Russell, Press Release, January 13, 1959, Russell Papers, Civil Rights Series, X:117. RL; *New York Times*, January 10, 13, 1959; *Congressional Record*, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 207–08, 298, 446, 492–94.
  78. *New York Times*, January 10, 13, 1959.
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  83. *PPP,DDE*, 1959, pp. 164–67.
  84. *Congressional Record*, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., September 14, 1959, 19567.
  85. *Congressional Record*, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., February 15, 1960, 2470; *New York Times*, February 14, 15, 16, 1960.
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  87. *New York Times*. February 16, 1960.
  88. Gerry W. Siegel, "Analysis of H.R. 8601, Civil Rights Bill," March 25, 1960, Johnson Papers, Civil Rights, U.S. Senate, 1949–1961, Box 13. LBJL.
  89. *Congressional Record*, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., March 24, 1960, 6452–55.
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  91. *New York Times*, April 4, 8, 1960; *Congressional Record*, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., 7225.
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  96. Mark Stern, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 19 (1989); 808–11.
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103. Johnson, *Vantage Point*, pp. 157–8.
104. Richard Russell to Herbert A. Morrow, September 26, 1964, Russell Papers, Political Series, VI:23. Russell Library.
105. Richard Russell to William M. Garland, November 23, 1964, Russell Papers, Political Series, VI:18. RL. See also: Richard Russell to Jimmy Carter, September 1, 1964, Political Correspondence File, Dictation Series, Russell Papers. RL.
106. Richard Russell to Zac Crittenden, August 5, 1965, Russell Papers, Civil Rights Series, X:47. RL.
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